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I. INTRODUCTION
Writing this Reflection during the Year of the Tiger1 about the
“National Security and Intellectual Property” panel (“IP panel”) of the
Seton Hall Law Review Symposium turned my thoughts to a Chinese
saying: “If you ride a tiger, it is hard to dismount” (骑虎难下).2 The
literal image created by this saying portrays a person who fears getting
hurt—or even consumed—if they try to dismount the tiger.
Figuratively, it refers to a situation without a clear path for retreat, so
you stay the course.
This saying is apt in part because the IP panel, not surprisingly,
focused on China. The U.S. government has identified as a paramount
threat the government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC or China)
and intertwined Chinese Communist Party (CCP, and the collective
ruling entity best termed the PRC party-state): “About 80 percent of all
economic espionage prosecutions brought by the U.S. Department of
Justice (DOJ) allege conduct that would benefit the Chinese state, and
there is at least some nexus to China in around 60 percent of all trade
secret theft cases.”3

* Professor of Law, Seton Hall University.
1 The Year of the Tiger began February 1, 2022. See Chinese New Year 2022: Year of
the Tiger, CHINESE NEW YEAR, https://chinesenewyear.net/ (last visited Feb. 19, 2022).
2 See, e.g., PLECO, https://www.pleco.com/ (Chinese dictionary app) (last visited
Feb. 19, 2022).
3 U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., INFORMATION ABOUT THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE’S CHINA INITIATIVE
AND A COMPILATION OF CHINA-RELATED PROSECUTIONS SINCE 2018, https://www.justice.gov/
nsd/information-about-department-justice-s-china-initiative-and-compilation-chinarelated (last updated Nov. 19, 2021) [hereinafter CHINA-RELATED PROSECUTIONS].
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The meaning of the tiger saying is fitting because a critical piece in
the U.S. government’s response to concerns about intellectual property
(IP) theft tied to the PRC party-state was for over three years the China
Initiative: a DOJ-led effort “reflect[ing] the strategic priority of
countering Chinese national security threats . . . .”4 Launched in
November 2018 under President Trump, this tiger continued to barrel
forward under President Biden with, for example, Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) Director Christopher Wray emphasizing that the FBI
was opening counterintelligence investigations connected to China
every twelve hours.5
As recently as January 31, 2022, Director Wray drew parallels to
the Cold War, stressing that today “the United States and the Western
world find ourselves in a very different struggle against another global
adversary—the Chinese Communist Party” and explaining his focus on
“the threat posed by the Chinese government” because “in many ways
it’s reached a new level—more brazen, more damaging than ever before,
and it’s vital—vital—that all of us focus on that threat together.”6
Nonetheless, less than a month after this speech, the DOJ concluded that
the Initiative was “not the right approach” and replaced the China
Initiative with a new “Strategy for Countering Nation-State Threats.”7
Formally ending the China Initiative was the first step in the DOJ
transitioning to this country-neutral strategy that has the potential to be
both a more holistic and less rhetorically charged approach to
protecting IP and research integrity.
That the Biden administration took so long to end the China
Initiative was, of course, not because it was worried that the Initiative’s
sharp teeth of criminal prosecutions would directly harm itself. Rather,
the challenge of dismounting was to reassure domestic audiences that
there was no slackening with respect to vigilantly protecting against
national security threats tied to the PRC party-state. In other words, the
Id.
Dareh Gregorian, FBI Director Says New Probes into China Launched ‘Every 12
Hours,’ NBC NEWS (Sept. 21, 2021, 11:59 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/
national-security/fbi-director-says-new-probes-china-launched-every-12-hoursn1279724.
6 Christopher Wray, Dir., Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Countering Threats Posed by
the Chinese Government Inside the U.S. (Jan. 31, 2022) (transcript available at
https://www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/countering-threats-posed-by-the-chinesegovernment-inside-the-us-wray-013122) (remarks given at the Ronald Reagan
Presidential Library and Museum).
7 Matthew Olsen, Assistant Att’y Gen., Assistant Attorney General Matthew Olsen
Delivers Remarks on Countering Nation-State Threats (Feb. 23, 2022) (transcript
available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assistant-attorney-general-matthew
-olsen-delivers-remarks-countering-nation-state-threats) (remarks given at George
Mason University).
4
5
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Biden administration sought to project that it was landing firmly on the
ground ready to safeguard national security without the ‘China
Initiative’ framing. Yet the announcement ending the China Initiative
was followed by criticism that the dismount left the United States
tumbling in the dirt. Some Republican members of Congress, in
particular, immediately reacted that this was a dangerous softening in
U.S. policy toward the PRC.8
I followed the China Initiative closely throughout its existence and,
along with other critics, was deeply concerned about its potential to fuel
bias and create a chilling effect among researchers with ties to the PRC
based on ethnicity, nationality, or national origin. In short, framing the
initiative in terms of “China” placed a cloud of suspicion over people
connected therewith.9 This Reflection briefly explains the China
Initiative (The Tiger) and its path up to its conclusion in late-February
2022 (The Ride). Finally, this Reflection encourages an offramp (The
Dismount) that not only ends use of the ‘China Initiative’ title but also
energizes a multifaceted effort to strengthen protection of IP and
research integrity while mitigating bias.
II. THE TIGER
The China Initiative did not emerge out of thin air. The U.S.
government had for years been increasingly concerned about protecting
IP owned by U.S. entities from being stolen by PRC-based entities. In
addition to bringing criminal penalties, it also increased its public-facing
efforts. Near the end of the Obama administration, for instance, the FBI
released a “threat-awareness film” titled “The Company Man” that told

8 See, e.g., Press Release, Chuck Grassley, Grassley Pushes DOJ to Reconsider Plans
to Cancel China Crackdown Amid Persistent Threats (Feb. 28, 2022), https://
www.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-releases/grassley-pushes-doj-to-reconsiderplans-to-cancel-china-crackdown-amid-persistent-threats; Press Release, Tom Cotton,
Cotton Statement on DOJ Termination of its “China Initiative” (Feb. 23, 2022), https://
www.cotton.senate.gov/news/press-releases/cotton-statement-on-doj-terminationof-its-china-initiative (“Cancelling this initiative is just another instance of weakness
from an administration more concerned with being politically correct than protecting
Americans.”); Press Release, Marco Rubio, Rubio Releases Statement on DOJ’s Decision
to End China Initiative (Feb. 23, 2022), https://www.rubio.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/press-releases?ID=8FE8C7EF-F7CE-437D-8176-40CDD1B9731C (arguing that
by ending the Initiative, “the Biden Administration is once again showing that it just
doesn’t understand the nature or severity of the CCP’s threat”).
9 See generally Margaret K. Lewis, Criminalizing China, 111 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
145 (2021); Margaret K. Lewis, Time to End the U.S. Justice Department’s China Initiative,
FOREIGN POL’Y (July 22, 2021, 1:15 PM), https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/07/22/chinainitiative-espionage-mistrial-hu/.
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the story of an American who provided his employer’s trade secrets to
PRC nationals.10
What changed under the Trump administration was the framing of
the threat narrative and the emphasis placed on using criminal law as
means of protecting IP. At the Initiative’s launch in November 2018,
then-Attorney General Jeff Sessions stated that, “under President
Donald Trump, the United States is standing up to the deliberate,
systematic, and calculated threats posed, in particular, by the
communist regime in China, which is notorious around the world for
intellectual property theft.”11
Beyond the China Initiative itself, the Trump administration
depicted an existential threat posed by the PRC. The introduction to the
Trump White House’s collection of speeches on China begins by
declaring that, “[f]or decades, Donald J. Trump was one of the few
prominent Americans to recognize the true nature of the Chinese
Communist Party and its threat to America’s economic and political way
of life.”12 The FBI likewise articulated an expansive “China Threat”
narrative describing “the government of China and the Chinese
Communist Party [as] a grave threat to the economic well-being and
democratic values of the United States.”13
In addition to stressing the “communist regime,” the Trump
administration emphasized the role of “non-traditional collectors”:
academics, students, businesspeople, and other actors who do not fall
under the traditional ‘spy’ profile.14 The Trump administration
simultaneously warned against and welcomed Chinese students and
scholars. In “China: The Risk to Academia,” the FBI notes that it
“recognizes, and values, [the] unique package of benefits these

10 The Company Man: Protecting America’s Secrets, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (July
23, 2015), https://www.fbi.gov/video-repository/newss-the-company-man-protecting-americas-secrets/view.
11 U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., Attorney General Jeff Sessions Announces New Initiative to
Combat Chinese Economic Espionage (Nov. 1, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/
speech/attorney-general-jeff-sessions-announces-new-initiative-combat-chinese-economic-espionage.
12 Robert C. O’Brien, Introduction, in TRUMP ON CHINA: PUTTING AMERICA FIRST 1 (Robert
C. O’Brien, ed., 2020), https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/
2020/11/Trump-on-China-Putting-America-First.pdf.
13 The China Threat, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/
counterintelligence/the-china-threat (last visited Feb. 7, 2022).
14 See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., The China Initiative: Year-in-Review (2019–
20) (Nov. 16, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/china-initiative-year-review2019-20 (warning of PRC-funded “talent programs” as part of the section titled “Develop
an enforcement strategy for non-traditional collectors”).
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international students and professors provide.”15 The same publication
warns, however, that the United States’ open academic environment
“also puts academia at risk for exploitation by foreign actors who do not
follow our rules or share our values,” and that “the Chinese government
uses some Chinese students—mostly post-graduate students and postdoctorate researchers studying science, technology, engineering, and
mathematics (STEM)—and professors to operate as non-traditional
collectors of intellectual property . . . .”16
The front page of the FBI publication includes both a large map of
China with the PRC flag and a highlighted box asserting, “[t]he annual
cost to the U.S. economy of counterfeit goods, pirated software, and theft
of trade secrets is $226–$600 BILLION.” While recognizing that the PRC
party-state has incentivized and even directed activities that violate U.S.
criminal laws, the scope and scale of those threats remains debated.
Mark Cohen of Berkeley Law, who formerly worked for the U.S.
government, cautioned in 2019 that “[t]hese numbers have taken on a
greater legitimacy than they likely deserve, in terms of capturing the
scope of US concerns, the magnitude of the loss and shaping the Trump
administration’s unilateral retaliation.”17
Economic (or “industrial”) espionage—trade secret theft with a
nexus to a foreign government or entity connected therewith18—was
the marquee crime when the DOJ kicked off the China Initiative. The
initial announcement, for example, was accompanied by an indictment
of a PRC state-owned enterprise and other defendants of a conspiracy
to commit economic espionage.19 Yet the Initiative was framed in much
broader terms. The ten bullet-pointed goals of the Initiative addressed
concerns from “potential threats to academic freedom” to “supply chain
threats.”20
The scope of the Initiative as set forth in 2018 was thus broad and
somewhat blurry. A connection with the PRC was necessary, but not
sufficient, for the DOJ to refer to a case as part of the China Initiative. For
15 FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CHINA: THE RISK TO ACADEMIA 8 (2019),
https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/china-risk-to-academia-2019.pdf/view
[https://perma.cc/HNW9-U79M].
16 Id. at 1–2.
17 Mark Cohen, The 600 Billion Dollar China IP Echo Chamber, CHINA IPR (May 12,
2019), https://chinaipr.com/2019/05/12/the-600-billion-dollar-china-ip-echo-chamber/.
18 18 U.S.C. § 1831.
19 See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., PRC State-Owned Company, Taiwan
Company, and Three Individuals Charged With Economic Espionage (Nov. 1, 2018),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/prc-state-owned-company-taiwan-company-andthree-individuals-charged-economic-espionage.
20 CHINA-RELATED PROSECUTIONS, supra note 3.
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example, while halting the importation of the illicit drug fentanyl and its
precursors from the PRC is a U.S. government priority21—and the DOJ
had active cases during the time of the China Initiative22—no fentanylrelated cases were listed on the DOJ’s China Initiative webpage, nor
were the words “drugs” or “narcotics” mentioned.
Indictments did not get stamped “China Initiative,” nor was there a
definitive list of China Initiative cases. The DOJ maintained a list of
“China-related cases examples,”23 which was not static. In addition to
cases understandably being added as they were brought, others were
removed. Some cases were removed because they did not result in
convictions,24 and others for unexplained reasons but presumably
because reconsideration deemed them outside the China Initiative’s
mission: “Some cases, [a former DOJ official] said, such as that of a man
who organized a turtle-smuggling ring, originally may have been added
to the department’s list by mistake.”25
Nor did the DOJ conceive the China Initiative as having any set
duration. In contrast, the long-term, existential nature of the described
threat from China by the Trump administration suggested that it would
have a prolonged existence.26 What was less expected, however, was the

21 LIANA W. ROSEN & SUSAN V. LAWRENCE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., IF 10890, CHINA PRIMER:
ILLICIT FENTANYL AND CHINA’S ROLE (2021), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/
pdf/IF/IF10890 (“In recent years, counternarcotics attention has focused on reducing
fentanyl flows from China.”); see also id. at 2 (“Some U.S. objectives with respect to China
remain unmet. China has not taken action to control additional fentanyl precursors,
following China’s listing of two fentanyl precursors, NPP and 4-ANPP, as controlled
substances in February 2018.”).
22 See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Man Convicted of Conspiracy to Import
and Distribute Fentanyl (July 9, 2021), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/man-convicted-conspiracy-import-and-distribute-fentanyl.
23 CHINA-RELATED PROSECUTIONS, supra note 3.
24 See, e.g., Eileen Guo, Jess Aloe & Karen Hao, We Built a Database to Understand the
China Initiative. Then the Government Changed Its Records., MIT TECH. REV. (Dec. 2, 2021),
https://www.technologyreview.com/2021/12/02/1039397/china-initiative-database-doj; see also Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Researcher at University Arrested for
Wire Fraud and Making False Statements About Affiliation with a Chinese University
(Feb. 27, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/researcher-university-arrestedwire-fraud-and-making-false-statements-about-affiliation (including updated notation
that “[t]he defendant in this case, Anming Hu, was acquitted by the court of the charges
alleged in the indictment described in the press release below”).
25 Guo et al., supra note 24.
26 See, e.g., Secretary Michael R. Pompeo With Ben Shapiro of The Ben Shapiro Show,
U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Dec. 15, 2020), https://2017-2021.state.gov/secretary-michael-rpompeo-with-ben-shapiro-of-the-ben-shapiro-show-6/index.html (“This challenge
from the Chinese Communist Party is the most existential threat to the United States and
its prosperity and security. President Trump is the first president to have recognized
that.”).
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China Initiative’s continued momentum once President Biden took
office.
III. THE RIDE
The China Initiative carried through the Trump administration and
more than a year under President Biden. Economic espionage remained
a concern over the China Initiative’s three-year history. In late 2021, for
example, the FBI released the documentary “Made in Beijing: The Plan
for Global Market Domination,” which it describes as using “interviews
with executives from victim companies to create a compelling narrative
for the private sector and help them protect their intellectual property
against industrial espionage by the [CCP].”27
The bulk of China Initiative cases, however, focused not on the
theft, or attempted theft, of IP, but rather on research integrity—a key
component of which is honesty, including, as described by the National
Institutes of Health, “following commonly accepted professional codes
or norms.”28 Charges related to transparency and honesty in research
include false statements, wire fraud, tax fraud, and similar offenses
involving lying or concealment. When in late 2021 reporters at MIT
Technology Review sought to “create as comprehensive a database of
China Initiative prosecutions as possible[,]” they found that “only 13 of
the 23 research integrity cases included in our database are currently
on the website. (One of those cases was settled before charges could be
filed.) Six of those cases ended in guilty pleas. Seven are still pending.”29
A Bloomberg analysis released in December 2021 found as follows:
[O]f the 50 indictments announced or unsealed since the start
of the program and posted on the Justice Department’s China
Initiative webpage reveals a further problem: The China
Initiative hasn’t been very successful at catching spies. The
largest group of cases, 38% of the total, have charged
academic researchers and professors with fraud for failing to
disclose affiliations with Chinese universities. None of them
has been accused of spying, and almost half of those cases
have been dropped. About half as many China Initiative cases
concern violations of U.S. sanctions or illegal exports, and a
smaller percentage involve cyber intrusions that prosecutors
27 FBI – Federal Bureau of Investigation, Made in Beijing: The Plan for Global Market
Domination, YOUTUBE (Nov. 5, 2021), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
HAe4PWjP1f0.
28 NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH, What is Research Integrity, https://grants.nih.gov/policy/
research_integrity/what-is.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2022).
29 Guo et al., supra note 24.
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attributed to China. Only 20% of the cases allege economic
espionage, and most of those are unresolved. Just three claim
that secrets were handed over to Chinese agents.30
This Initiative’s path thus proved a bumpy ride. There were
convictions: the DOJ’s National Security Division spokesperson reported
in late 2021, “[s]ince November 2018, we have brought or resolved nine
economic espionage prosecutions and seven theft of trade secrets cases
with a nexus to the PRC. We also have brought 12 matters involving
fraud on universities and/or grant making institutions . . . .”31
Yet, at the end of 2021, “[i]n eight cases, academics have pleaded
guilty and received prison sentences of up to thirty-seven months. But
the government dropped its prosecution of seven other scientists.”32 At
the time of writing, the trial was imminent of a China Initiative case
involving an academic, Franklin (Feng) Tao, who allegedly failed to
disclose participation in a PRC-government talent program.33 To date,
however, the only guilty verdict from a jury in a case involving an
academic under the China Initiative came in December 2021. Charles
Lieber, the former Chair of Harvard University’s Chemistry and
Chemical Biology Department, was convicted of making false
statements, filing false tax returns, and failing to report a bank account
in China.34
The evidence included video footage of Lieber’s

30 Sheridan Prasso, China Initiative Set Out to Catch Spies. It Didn’t Find Many,
BLOOMBERG (Dec. 14, 2021, 10:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/
2021-12-14/doj-china-initiative-to-catch-spies-prompts-fbi-misconduct-racismclaims.
31 Guo et al., supra note 24.
32 Jeffrey Mervis, What the Charles Lieber Verdict Says About U.S. China Initiative,
SCIENCE (Dec. 28, 2021, 3:40 PM), https://www.science.org/content/article/whatcharles-lieber-verdict-says-about-u-s-china-initiative.
That the vast majority of
convictions under the China Initiative umbrella have been in the form of guilty pleas is
not surprising. Plea bargaining is a dominant feature of the federal criminal justice
system. See, e.g., RAM SUBRAMANIAN ET AL., IN THE SHADOWS: A REVIEW OF THE RESEARCH ON PLEA
BARGAINING, VERA INST. OF JUST. (2020), https://www.vera.org/downloads/
publications/in-the-shadows-plea-bargaining.pdf (“Only 2 percent of federal criminal
cases—and a similar number of state cases—are brought to trial.”).
33 See Gideon Lewis-Kraus, Have Chinese Spies Infiltrated American Campuses?, NEW
YORKER (Mar. 14, 2022), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2022/03/21/havechinese-spies-infiltrated-american-campuses (examining the pending case against
Franklin (Feng) Tao, a chemistry professor at the University of Kansas).
34 See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Harvard University Professor Convicted of
Making False Statements and Tax Offenses (Dec. 21, 2021), https://www.justice.gov/
opa/pr/harvard-university-professor-convicted-making-false-statements-and-taxoffenses. See generally The Lawfare Podcast: Dr. Charles Lieber and the China Initiative,
LAWFARE (Jan. 11, 2022), https://www.lawfareblog.com/lawfare-podcast-dr-charleslieber-and-china-initiative (Jacob Schulz, Emily Weinstein, and Margaret Lewis
discussing the verdict and the China Initiative generally.).
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interrogation by the FBI in which he acknowledged that the government
had “damning” evidence against him.35
In contrast to the unanimous jury verdict after less than three
hours of deliberation in the Lieber case,36 the jury deadlocked in the case
of Anming Hu, a professor at the University of Tennessee, Knoxville, who
was charged with wire fraud and false statements.37 When the DOJ
decided to pursue a new trial,38 Judge Thomas A. Varlan issued a
judgment of acquittal on all counts because the government failed to
provide sufficient evidence to prove that Hu had the requisite intent to
defraud NASA by failing to disclose an affiliation with a Chinese
academic institution.39 The fifty-two-page opinion emphasized the high
bar: “[G]ranting a motion for a judgment of acquittal is ‘confined to cases
where the prosecution’s failure is clear.’”40
In January 2022, news broke regarding the demise of another highprofile case under the China Initiative. Massachusetts Institute of
Technology (MIT) Professor Gang Chen faced charges based on alleged
concealment of ties to PRC-based institutions in grant filings with the
U.S. Department of Energy.41 Chen firmly asserted his innocence, and
his colleagues at MIT voiced their strong support,42 along with the highly
unusual step of MIT paying his legal bills.43 On January 14, 2022, the
Mervis, supra note 32.
Id.
37 See David Nakamura & Ellen Nakashima, Mistrial in Justice Dept. Fraud Case
Against College Professor Prompts Renewed Scrutiny of Agency’s ‘China Initiative’, WASH.
POST (June 17, 2021. 7:06 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/
doj-china-initiative-mistrial/2021/06/17/7571c73c-cf8f-11eb-80142f3926ca24d9_story.html.
38 See Chinese Espionage Retrial Sought for Tennessee Researcher, ASSOCIATED PRESS
(Aug. 3, 2021), https://apnews.com/article/technology-business-education-tennesseeespionage-0145bdff82b8b00932794295cd270686.
39 CT. LISTENER, Judgment of Acquittal as to Anming Hu, United States v. Hu, Case No.
3:20-cr-00021 (E.D. Tenn.) (Sept. 9, 2021), https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/
16900191/united-states-v-hu-tv1/.
40 CT. LISTENER, Memorandum Opinion and Order as to Anming Hu, United States v.
Hu, Case No. 3:20-cr-00021 (E.D. Tenn.) (Sept. 9, 2021), https://
www.courtlistener.com/docket/16900191/united-states-v-hu-tv1/ (quoting United
States v. Donaldson, 52 F. App’x 700, 706 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting Burks v. United States,
437 U.S. 1, 17 (1978)).
41 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., MIT Professor Indicted on Charges Related to
Grant Fraud (Jan. 20, 2021), https://www.justice.gov/usao-ma/pr/mit-professor-indicted-charges-relating-grant-fraud.
42 See Why Have We, a Group of MIT Faculty, Signed the Letter in Support of Gang
Chen?, MIT Faculty Newsletter (Jan./Feb. 2021), https://fnl.mit.edu/january-february2021/why-have-we-a-group-of-mit-faculty-signed-the-letter-in-support-of-gangchen/.
43 See Ellen Nakashima & David Nakamura, In High-Profile Case Against MIT’s Gang
Chen, Prosecutors Seeking to Drop Charges, WASH. POST (Jan. 14, 2022, 1:37 PM),
35
36
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Wall Street Journal reported that prosecutors in the case recommended
to the DOJ headquarters that it drop the case.44 When announcing the
case’s dismissal on January 20, Rachael Rollins, the newly appointed U.S.
Attorney for the District of Massachusetts, released a statement that the
dismissal was “in the interests of justice” because of “recently obtained
additional information pertaining to the materiality of Professor Chen’s
alleged omissions in the context of the grant review process . . . .”45
Chen’s case underscored a primary concern raised by me and other
critics of the China Initiative: framing the initiative in terms of “China”
has put people who are seen as connected to China based on their
nationality, national origin, ethnicity,46 and other bases under enhanced
scrutiny.47 When announcing charges against naturalized U.S. citizen
Chen in January 2021, Andrew Lelling—then-U.S. Attorney for the
District of Massachusetts—went so far as to assert, “‘[t]he allegations of
the complaint imply that this was not just about greed, but about loyalty
to China.’”48 The comment struck a nerve given the deep history of

https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/gang-chen-charges-drop-china/
2022/01/14/51bae1e2-6f59-11ec-b9fc-b394d592a7a6_story.html (“Chen has been on
paid leave since he was arrested last January. MIT has been footing his legal bill.”).
44 See Aruna Viswanatha, Prosecutors Recommend Dropping Case Over China Ties
Against MIT Scientist, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 14, 2022, 11:51 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/prosecutors-recommend-dropping-case-over-china-ties-against-mit-scientist11642177123.
45 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Statement from U.S. Attorney Rachael S. Rollins
on the Dismissal of the Gang Chen Case (Jan. 20, 2022), https://www.justice.gov/usaoma/pr/statement-us-attorney-rachael-s-rollins-dismissal-gang-chen-case.
46 I use “ethnicity,” though “race” is also used in discussions about the China
Initiative. The U.S. census includes “Asian” as a racial category. About the Topic of Race,
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/topics/population/race/about.html (last
updated Mar. 1, 2022). I use “ethnicity” to emphasize common ties to the PRC or, if predating 1949, the area that is now the PRC. Cf. Race & Ethnicity, GENDERED INNOVATIONS,
https://genderedinnovations.stanford.edu/terms/race.html
(“Ethnicity
denotes
groups, such as Irish, Fijian, or Sioux, etc., that share a common identity-based ancestry,
language, or culture.”).
47 See, e.g., Press Release, AAJC Delivers Petition of Nearly 30,000 Signatures Urging
President Biden to End the “China Initiative,” ASIAN AMS. ADVANCING JUST. (Apr. 12, 2021),
https://advancingjustice-aajc.org/petition-delivered-end-china-initiative (“[U]rging
the administration to put an immediate end to the ‘China Initiative’ and take action to
combat the racial profiling and targeting of Asian Americans and Asian immigrants by
federal agencies.”); Letter to the Hon. Merrick B. Garland, U.S. Att’y Gen. (Jan. 10, 2022),
https://www.apajustice.org/uploads/1/1/5/7/115708039/yale_open_letter_to_attor
ney_general_jan_10_2022.pdf (Letter signed by 192 Yale University faculty concurring
with a 2021 letter signed by 177 Stanford University faculty and asserting that the
Initiative is “fueling biases that, in turn, raise concerns about racial profiling”).
48 Ellen Barry, A Scientist Is Arrested, and Academics Push Back, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 26,
2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/26/us/mit-scientist-charges.html.
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distrust of Chinese-American scientists.49 That the late-2021 MIT
Technology Review investigation found that nearly 90 percent of
defendants under the China Initiative were of Chinese heritage
underscores the Initiative’s disproportional impact.50
DOJ officials have pushed back on these concerns, stressing that the
focus “is on behavior, not ethnicity.”51 When ending the China Initiative,
Assistant Attorney General Matthew Olsen acknowledged the “harmful
perception that the department applies a lower standard to investigate
and prosecute criminal conduct related to that country or that we in
some way view people with racial, ethnic or familial ties to China
differently.”52 He was clear, however, that the DOJ found no basis during
its review of the program that this perception was indeed reality: “I
never saw any indication, none, that any decision that the Justice
Department made was based on bias or prejudice of any kind.”53
Disproportionate effects alone do not prove discriminatory intent,
but the vastly disproportionate prosecutions of ethnically Chinese
defendants—and the acquittals and dropping of cases—gives reason to
question how cases are initiated and what oversight is present at all
steps in the process. Moreover, even though the Biden administration
pulled back on the mentions of “loyalty” and other problematic rhetoric
under the Trump administration, the DOJ’s assurances remain
unsatisfying because we know from work by the American Bar
Association and others that implicit bias can influence the behavior of
well-intentioned investigators and prosecutors.54
Concerns about bias are reason enough to question the China
Initiative, given that a foundational principle of criminal justice in the
United States is non-discrimination—even if there is much work to be
done in upholding that value. No matter how many times the U.S.
49 See Mara Hvistendahl, The FBI’s China Obsession, THE INTERCEPT (Feb. 2, 2020, 5:00
AM), https://theintercept.com/2020/02/02/fbi-chinese-scientists-surveillance/.
50 See Kaiser Kuo, Inside the DOJ’s China Initiative with the MIT Technology Review,
SUPCHINA (Dec. 23, 2021), https://supchina.com/2021/12/23/inside-the-dojs-china-initiative/ (journalists Eileen Guo and Jess Aloe discussing the 130 out of 148 number in
their findings).
51 Laura Lambert, Three Takes on the China Initiative, from the USC U.S.-China
Institute, USC GLOB. (Oct. 7, 2020), https://global.usc.edu/three-takes-on-the-chinainitiative-from-the-usc-u-s-china-institute/ (quoting then-Assistant Attorney General
for National Security, John Demers).
52 Olsen, supra note 7.
53 Hadley Baker, Lawfare No Bull: The DOJ’s Role in Combatting Nation State Threats,
LAWFARE (Feb. 25, 2022, 10:08 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/lawfare-no-bulldojs-role-combatting-nation-state-threats (audio replay of question and answer portion
of Olsen’s February 23, 2022, remarks).
54 See Implicit Bias Videos and Toolkit, AM. BAR ASS’N, https://www.american
bar.org/groups/diversity/resources/implicit-bias/ (last visited Feb. 23, 2022).
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government reiterates that it is surgically targeting threats from the PRC
party-state, that bias is influencing at least some decisions is
increasingly difficult for the government to refute when its pervasive
“Chinese national security threats”55 language is coupled with the
collapse of several high-profile prosecutions of people of Chinese
descent who had the resources and will to vigorously challenge the
government’s allegations. For those defendants under the China
Initiative who entered guilty pleas, little is known about the
circumstances surrounding those cases because of the lack of
transparency in the plea-bargaining process.
That there is increasing documentation of a chilling effect adds
another layer of critique: the China Initiative undermined the very
economic competitiveness that it was meant to support. Researchers at
the University of Arizona, for example, found that “among scientists of
Chinese descent, more than 40 percent . . . reported feeling profiled by
the U.S. government. By comparison, less than 10 percent of nonChinese researchers said they believed they had been singled out
because of their race.”56 This chilling effect has spurred worries that it
will be more difficult to recruit talented students and researchers from
China and that those in the United States will depart: “‘There are
certainly people leaving,’ says Steven Chu, a Nobel-prizewinning
physicist at Stanford.”57
IV. THE DISMOUNT
Reports surfaced in fall 2022 that the Biden administration was
looking for a way off the tiger. The new Assistant Attorney General for
National Security, Matthew Olsen, led a review of the China Initiative
beyond the case-specific reviews that have already resulted in the DOJ
dropping a number of cases.58 With tiger years known as a time for bold
action,59 eyes were on the DOJ to see whether it would choose mild

CHINA-RELATED PROSECUTIONS, supra note 3.
Karin Fischer, Chinese Scientists Feel a Chill Under U.S. Investigation of Higher Ed’s
China Ties, a New Survey Shows, THE CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. (Oct. 28, 2021),
https://www.chronicle.com/article/chinese-scientists-feel-a-chill-under-u-s-investigation-of-higher-eds-china-ties-a-new-survey-shows.
57 Andrew Silver, U.S. Political Crackdown Spurs Fears of Chinese Brain-Drain, NATURE
(Sept. 7, 2020), https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-020-02359-5.
58 See Viswanatha, supra note 44 (reporting that Attorney General Garland tasked
Olsen “with reviewing the department’s approach to countering threats posed by the
Chinese government”).
59 2022 Chinese Zodiac Predictions: What Will the Year of the Tiger Bring?, HARPER’S
BAZAAR (SINGAPORE) (Jan. 9, 2022), https://www.harpersbazaar.com.sg/gallery/2022chinese-zodiac-predictions/.
55
56
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recalibration as compared with a robust, holistic reform to the DOJ’s use
of criminal law to protect both IP and broader research integrity.
President Biden voiced the need for boldness in other contexts. On
the anniversary of the January 6, 2021, assault on the U.S. Capitol,
President Biden addressed the need to grapple with events on that date:
This isn’t about being bogged down in the past. This is about
making sure the past isn’t buried. That’s the only way
forward. That’s what great nations do. They don’t bury the
truth, they face up to it. Sounds like hyperbole, but that’s the
truth: They face up to it. We are a great nation.60
Truly ending the China Initiative likewise requires not just
removing the name but also the more challenging work of reflecting on
the long history of discrimination against people of Chinese descent—
and of Asian Americans and Pacific Islanders more broadly—and doing
the work to reduce how bias can permeate into decision-making. The
DOJ has yet to face up to this past or articulate a path that will protect
against bias in the future.
Specifically, while the DOJ’s long-awaited announcement on
February 23, 2022, took the critical step of removing the ‘China
Initiative’ name, it left open questions about how the replacement
‘Strategy for Countering Nation-State Threats’ would differ in practice.61
Was this an actual dismount or rather a decision to continue the ride
while calling the tiger a different name? Assistant Attorney General
Olsen recognized that “by grouping cases under the China Initiative
rubric, we helped give rise to a harmful perception that the department
applies a lower standard to investigate and prosecute criminal conduct
related to that country or that we in some way view people with racial,
ethnic or familial ties to China differently.”62 As noted above, however,
he made clear that the DOJ’s review found that this view was merely a
“perception” with no factual basis.63
Assistant Attorney General Olsen further assured that the DOJ
would alter its approach to academic integrity and research security
cases by applying a more stringent review when determining “whether
criminal prosecution is warranted or whether civil or administrative

60 Remarks by President Biden to Mark One Year Since the January 6th Deadly Assault
on the U.S. Capitol, THE WHITE HOUSE (Jan. 6, 2022, 9:16 AM), https://
www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2022/01/06/remarks-bypresident-biden-to-mark-one-year-since-the-january-6th-deadly-assault-on-the-u-scapitol/.
61 Olsen, supra note 7.
62 Id.
63 See supra notes 52–53.
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remedies are more appropriate.”64 A pressing concern is what the DOJ’s
enhanced supervision of these cases will entail and, most immediately,
what guardrails are being built to scrutinize how potential criminal
cases are identified and proceed toward trial. That the DOJ made no
alterations to Franklin Tao’s case—one squarely in the academic
integrity and research security category65—nor explained why it was
proceeding to trial as before, exacerbated doubts about how different
the stated new approach would be.
To be clear, concerns about how the PRC leadership intends to
become the world’s primary center for science and technology66 are
well-founded, including that the PRC party-state will use both legal and
extralegal means in hopes of achieving this goal.67 But there is a smarter
way of pursuing the United States’ own goal of remaining a leader in
science and technology as, in President Biden’s words, “[w]e are in
competition with China and other countries to win the 21st century.”68
The Biden administration can be a tougher competitor with China by
being tough on bias and discrimination at home in the United States.
Alongside tackling issues of bias and fostering a more welcoming
and inclusive atmosphere for foreign talent, even greater momentum is
needed to clarify and streamline research reporting requirements. The
Trump administration issued Presidential Memorandum on United
States Government-Supported Research and Development National
Security Policy (known as NSPM-33) in its waning days.69 The Biden
administration issued guidance on implementing NSPM-33 in January
2022 following calls for public comments.70

Olsen, supra note 7.
See Lewis-Kraus, supra note 33.
66 See Xi Jinping: ‘Strive to Become the World’s Primary Center for Science and High
Ground for Innovation,’ DIGICHINA (Mar. 18, 2021), https://digichina.stanford.edu/
work/xi-jinping-strive-to-become-the-worlds-primary-center-for-science-and-highground-for-innovation/.
67 See, e.g., Legal, Illegal, and Extralegal: China’s Pursuit of Its Tech Future, CTR. FOR
SEC. & EMERGING TECH. (GEORGETOWN) (Mar. 18, 2021), https://cset.georgetown.edu/
event/legal-illegal-and-extralegal-chinas-pursuit-of-its-tech-future/.
68 Evelyn Cheng, Biden Calls for the U.S. to Become More Competitive Against a ‘Deadly
Earnest’ China, CNBC (Apr. 29, 2021, 1:15 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2021/04/29/
biden-calls-for-us-to-become-more-competitive-against-china.html.
69 Presidential Memorandum on United States Government-Supported Research and
Development National Security Policy, TRUMP WHITE HOUSE (Jan. 14, 2021),
https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/presidential-actions/presidential-memorandum-united-states-government-supported-research-development-national-securitypolicy/.
70 SUBCOMM. FOR RSCH. SEC. & JOINT COMM. ON THE RSCH. ENV’T, GUIDANCE FOR IMPLEMENTING
NATIONAL SECURITY PRESIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM 33 (NSPM-33) ON NATIONAL SECURITY
STRATEGY FOR UNITEED STATES GOVERNMENT—SUPPORTED RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT (2022),
64
65

LEWIS (DO NOT DELETE)

2022]

4/11/22 2:24 PM

DISMOUNTING THE TIGER

1001

NSPM-33 and the new guidelines lay a foundation. There is still
much work to do with respect to clarifying and streamlining grant
reporting procedures, as well as determining whether current research
security rules should be strengthened. There are also serious questions
about the appropriate use of disclosed information.71 The hope is that a
collaborative process involving governmental and non-governmental
actors will lead the United States to a place where the criminal law plays
only a backstop role in protecting research security and is accompanied
by measures that mitigate, even if not fully eliminate, bias.
Not just in the Year of the Tiger but also in the decades ahead, the
United States’ strength in science and technology—the foundation upon
which new valuable IP is created—will depend on sustaining an
environment that values creativity and openness. Interestingly, 2022 is
not merely a tiger year, it is a water tiger year. The rotation of the twelve
zodiac animals occurs along with the rotation of five elements (“wood,
fire, earth, metal and water”),72 with water tigers characterized as
“creative and open to change.”73 Perhaps then the goal for the U.S.
government over the remaining months of 2022 is to prove through
actions that it has indeed dismounted the ‘China Initiative’ tiger and,
instead, is transforming into a water tiger: to be bold and strong in
pursuing science and technology while being creative and open about
how to do this in a way that protects national security and the core
American value of equal justice to all.

https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/010422-NSPM-33Implementation-Guidance.pdf.
71 See Mitch Ambrose, White House Clarifies Disclosure Requirements for R&D
Funding, AM. INST. OF PHYSICS (Jan. 4, 2022), https://www.aip.org/fyi/2022/white-houseclarifies-disclosure-requirements-rd-funding.
72 Rachael Evans, What Does the Year of the Water Tiger Mean?, ABC EVERYDAY,
https://www.abc.net.au/everyday/what-does-the-year-of-the-water-tiger-mean-lunar-new-year-2022/100785464#:~:text=Dr%20Lin%20says%20that%20as,can%
20be%20associated%20with%20destruction.
73 HARPER’S BAZAAR, supra note 59.

